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Abstract: I argue for the importance of rhetorical schemes for 
understanding, diagnosing, and coping with forms of dementia. 
Schemes give salience (recruit attention), memorability (affect 
storage and facilitate retrieval), and aesthetic effects (induce a 
pleasurable emotional response) to configurations of language. 
They do so because of the way they play to neurocognitive pattern 
biases, like repetition, sequence, and position. Dementia is a 
condition under which language ability degrades, alongside 
memory and attention, but pattern biases appear to be 
comparatively robust, and schemic configurations become more 
and more frequent in dementia speech. Rhetorical schemes, that 
is, are notably resilient to the forces that diminish language use in 
individuals with dementia.  
 
With enough improvement in Rhetoric we may in time learn so 
much about words that they will tell us how our minds work. 
—I.A. Richards, Philosophy of Rhetoric (1936, p. 91) 
0. Two Tales of Resistance 
I have a neighbor, just into her seventies. She walks her dogs past 
my yard daily, and when she finds me puttering about, she infallibly 
asks, with a mischievous grin, "Are you working hard, or hardly 
working?" Same question. Every time. My neighbor is resisting the 
incursions of Alzheimer's Disease, resisting the erosion of her 
memory and her Self, and her armament includes rhetorical 
figures. 
Second tale. My father's early education was in a one-room school 
house in northern Canada with very limited resources. It was the 
Great Depression. Much of his learning was oral, with an emphasis 
on the memorization of narrative poetry—Tennyson, Kipling, 
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Service. He often enjoyed through the subsequent decades, in the 
company of friends, family, and whiskey, reeling off long, 
dramatically enacted, stretches of this poetry. But by his eighth 
decade, beset with dementia, he had become a shuffling, mumbling, 
slump-shouldered old man who could barely communicate. I 
bought a book of Robert Service's poetry, sat down beside him, and 
began reading aloud. 
There are strange things done in the midnight sun 
By the men who moil for gold; 
The Arctic trails have their secret tales 
That would make your blood run cold; 
The Northern Lights have seen queer sights, 
But the queerest they ever did see 
Was that night on the marge of Lake Lebarge 
I cremated Sam McGee. (Service, n.d. [1907]) 
I was looking for any kind of acknowledgement, but his face 
remained slack. He was very hard of hearing, too, which made the 
whole idea ludicrous.  
But soon he was looking down at the book in my hands. He hadn't 
read anything in years, but after a time he reached over, took the 
book out of my hands, and started running his finger along the lines 
of poetry, nodding almost imperceptibly. I could no longer see the 
words myself, so I left off reading. He continued to trace the lines. 
He traced them to the end of the page and turned the page to 
continue on the verso. But he turned two pages at once, so that he 
was looking at a different poem now. 'OK,' I thought. 'He was just 
running through some muscle-memory ritual. He has no idea what 
he is looking at.' Then, a fleeting miracle. He turned one page back, 
put his finger under the line at the top of the page, the correct line 
from where he had left off, followed it through to the end of the 
poem, and stopped.  
Like my neighbor, he was using rhetorical figures as a way to fight 
his dementia, not the direct conversational resistance that she is 
putting up, but a way to clear off some of the fog for a few moments 
by reaching deep into his pre-dementia memories for linguistic 
nuggets of isocolon, alliteration, rhyme, and assonance: linguistic 
configurations with cognitive resilience. 
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1. Introduction 
Rhetorical figures are neurocognitively motivated linguistic 
assemblages which achieve degrees of salience, memorability, and 
aesthetic pleasure by the way they recruit our biases for particular 
patterns and relationships. Their neurocognitive resonances enable 
figures to make specific colligations and constructions more 
resilient to the fragility of memory, individual and cultural; to the 
vagaries of attention, individual and cultural; to the presence of 
noise, internal and external; and to any combinations of the above. 
“An apple a day keeps the doctor away” is readily available to us 
when we are offering or commenting upon nutritional advice 
because it leverages rhyme (but not only rhyme) to effect a salient 
expression that propagates naturally in our culture, a mnemonically 
durable colligation that comes readily to individual speakers. 
Figures have been catalogued and studied for millennia along 
linguistic, semiotic, and formal dimensions, with schemes and 
tropes the two most robust categories. Those categories are the only 
two I will reference in this paper, with a decided focus on the 
former, schemes. While tropes certainly play a role in the cultural 
and individual cognitive resilience of colligations and constructions, 
they are conceptual figures and therefore less tractable on a number 
of measures, so they show up only incidentally in what follows.  
Schemes are material figures. They attract and maintain attention 
and stimulate aesthetic responses because of the patterning of their 
signantia (representamens, signifiers). We can take rhyme as our 
prototype. It occurs when at least two words end with the same 
syllabic nucleus and (optional) coda: an apple a day keeps the 
doctor away.1 Repetition reinforces the acoustic percept, 
presumably by activating very similar neural firing patterns, and 
when acoustic percepts are linguistic they have semiotic 
dimensions—meanings—so colligations like our apple-a-day 
proverb are resilient against the forces that degrade memory (forces 
I will collapse under the information-theoretic label, noise). That is: 
the form has neurocognitive durability, and the meaning is 
 
1 The terminology here is from autosegmental phonology (e.g., 
Goldsmith, 1976); in more traditional terms, this definition would read as 
‘… end with the same vowel and final consonant(s), when present, or the 
same vowel-consonant(s) sequence.’  
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packaged with the form.2 
The history of schemes reveals their powers of cognitive 
resilience. There is no evidence they were named or catalogued 
before 5th century BCE Greece, but figural instances are recorded 
much earlier; it is, in fact, very difficult to find any early text that is 
not overtly figured. And that early figuration indicates clearly that 
one of the chief functions of figures was to resist message 
degradation both individually and culturally. In pre-literate 
societies, there are few external technologies to fight the 
vulnerability of information in individuals and in their cultures,—
no writing systems, no notebooks, no digital protocols, no smart 
phones—very little beyond the individual mental resources of 
people and the distributed mental resources of their tribes, guilds, 
families and other information collectives; collectives which in turn 
depended on the mental resources of individual members. 
Rhetorical schemes aided the individual retention and the cultural 
transmission of history, technology, political arrangements, 
religious systems, ethical and practical maxims, and so on, in both 
stand-alone heuristics and amalgamated as mythical narratives. 
This has been well understood since at least the research of Milman 
Parry and Albert Lord on the great skeins of such information in 
epic poetry (Parry, 1971; Lord, 1960; Havelock, 1963; Rubin, 1995). 
Schemes were not just the vehicles of procedures and facts. Wisdom 
itself was necessarily dependent on schemic patterns in preliterate 
societies, since wisdom relies on a framework of memory. “Serious 
thought is intertwined with memory systems” in preliterate 
cultures, Walter Ong tells us: “Your thoughts must come into being 
in heavily rhythmic, balanced patterns, in repetitions or antitheses, 
 
2 I realize that some readers may balk at my evocation of the pre-
historic transmission/receiver model of Shannon and Weaver (1963) in 
the context of neurocognition, which we know is more dynamic, 
multiplex, and interactional than that model seems to support. Jordynn 
Jack, in fact, frames her Raveling the Brain in distinct opposition to the 
fantasy "that the brain ... can be simplified from a complicated, tangled 
network of neurons and synapses to something as uncomplicated as a 
single strand of thread" (2019, p. 2). In the Shannon and Weaver case, the 
single strand is a telegraph line. But it provides a conceit that, in one of 
the most common and powerful uses of metaphor, provides two sorts of 
simplifications with research virtues: reductionism and reification. My 
topic is big and diffuse. I am trying to make headway by concretizing and 
constraining it analogically. If and when we make sufficient headway into 
the neural correlates of pattern biases, attention, and so on, we might be 
able to ravel that telegraph line into networks. For now, we will have to 
make do with speculative approximations, not large-scale, fully raveled 
theories of the intersection of rhetorical figures and language pathologies.  
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in alliterations or assonances, in epithetic and other formulary 
expressions” (2002, p. 34). 
We still use schemes to the same end, with the much smaller 
information skeins we keep handy for verbal deployment in our 
literate and digital cultures. I don't know how accurate its 
predictions are, but the maxim "red sky in morning, sailors take 
warning; red sky at night, sailors delight" is a heuristic for making 
weather-based plans. It contains a double-dose of rhyme, of course, 
but also parison (structural repetition; AKA, “syntactic 
parallelism”) and isocolon (prosodic repetition; AKA “phonological 
parallelism”), as well as the trope, antithesis (and, for good 
measure, an ethotic appeal to those presumed weather authorities, 
sailors). Our apple-a-day nutritional heuristic features also 
features isocolon along with the rhyme—they often travel together, 
sometimes under the label, “poetry”—as well as some additional 
assonance (vowel repetition). “A friend in need is a friend indeed” is 
a social heuristic, with two instances of rhyme and some ploke 
(lexical repetition). “A penny saved is a penny earned” is an 
economic heuristic featuring ploke and isocolon. "Cleanliness is 
next to godliness," a personal hygiene heuristic, features 
homoioptoton (affix repetition on different lexical stems). And so 
on. Kenneth Burke famously called such cultural colligations as 
these, as well as poetry at large, "equipment for living," 
mechanisms for "arming us to confront perplexities and risks" 
(1941, p. 61). He did not, so far as I know, have dementia in mind as 
among those perplexities and risks.  
2. Dementia and Cognitive Resilience 
Cognitive resilience is a term used of individuals and populations in 
dementia studies. It is a hypothetical construct, a reification, for the 
observed resistance to mental decline (that is, for the lack, relatively 
minor degree, or slow development of clinically attested cognitive 
symptoms) in the presence of factors correlated with dementia—
evident most dramatically in people who show no particular failings 
in their memory, speech, or daily functioning, but whose brains 
after death are discovered to have physiological signatures of 
Alzheimer’s disease (such as protein tangles and beta-amyloid 
plaques).3 Certain brain structures (such as vigorous dendritic 
 
3 Characteristic of terminology in many areas of study, especially those 
with multiple distinct specialties contributing to them, the term cognitive 
resilience is not without complications. In fact, a Whitepaper on the usage 
is currently in development now, headed up by Yaakov Stern, who 
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spines; Boros et al., 2017) and aspects of personal history (such as 
strong teenage literacy; Fearon, 2017) correlate with such 
resistance. Many of those aging warily all around us are trying to 
inoculate themselves against dementia by such practices as playing 
sudoku, doing crosswords, learning foreign languages, and the like, 
activities alleged to build cognitive resilience.  
In this paper I pare away a bit of the analogic extension of the 
phrase, cognitive resilience, and use it to describe not people or 
populations (though I’m content to let that usage stand as well, in 
other contexts), but those material features of language that 
enhance the neurocognitive signal-to-noise ratio of colligations and 
constructions. Resilient, after all, is at base level a word for 
material integrity. It springs from resilīre (Latin), 'to jump back, to 
retire, withdraw, to recoil, shrink, to bounce back, rebound, to 
spring back, recoil, to return to a smaller size' (Oxford). It suggests 
an elasticity, a capacity to regain an original form after deforming 
 
originally introduced the related concept, cognitive reserve. See Stern et 
al., in press; this paper has apparently been completed but is under 
embargo for unstated reasons. The journal has published an abstract of 
the paper in their "Articles in Press," with no date or volume information 
(http://www.alzheimersanddementia.com/article/S1552-5260(18)33491-
5/fulltext), but nothing further is available from the journal. Meanwhile, 
PubMed (citing a September 2018 publication date!), states that "This 
article has a delayed release (embargo) and will be available in PMC on 
March 14, 2020" 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6417987/). When it 
becomes available, it should make for interesting reading.  
In the meantime, we can go with a standard operationalization. In her 
study of literacy as a factor in dementia-resistance, for instance, Danielle 
Fearon (2017) defines cognitive resilience as the characteristic of 
“avoiding the clinical symptoms of dementia despite having Alzheimer 
neuropathology present,” defined “as not meeting the clinical diagnosis of 
dementia according to DSM-IV criteria at last assessment while fulfilling 
CERAD neuropathologic criteria (“definite” or “probable”) or NIA-RI 
neuropathologic criteria (“definite”, “intermediate” or “high” likelihood) 
for AD,” following the National Institute on Aging guidelines (Hyman et 
al., 2012). (Abbreviation legend and references: AD = Alzheimer's 
Disease; CERAD = Consortium to Establish a Registry for Alzheimer's 
Disease (Mirra et al., 1991); DSM-IV = Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders, 4th Edition (American Psychiatric Association, 
1994), NIA-RI = National Institute on Aging, and Reagan Institute (NIA-
RI Working Group on Diagnostic Criteria for the Neuropathological 
Assessment of Alzheimer's Disease, 1997.) 
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pressures have passed; in effect, to withstand the forces that 
derange and distort material.   
Proverbs retain their material integrity against cultural forces. 
That’s how they become proverbs. That cultural robustness, in turn, 
depends on their cognitive resilience, since multiple individuals 
need to store, retrieve, and speak proverbs for them to propagate 
and lodge in a culture. They “are constantly heard by everyone so 
that they come to mind readily and … themselves are patterned for 
retention and ready recall” (Ong, 2002, p. 34). The culture and the 
individual are in a feedback loop: the more frequently an instance is 
spoken, the more culturally entrenched it is; the more culturally 
entrenched it is, the more frequently it is spoken. Configurations of 
language are resilient because of the neurocognitive resonances 
they activate.  
The paired information-theoretic notions of ‘noise’ and 
‘redundancy’ are helpful for understanding cultural robustness and 
cognitive resilience. The core analogy of noise in information theory 
is to acoustic noise that impedes aural communication. It’s harder 
to talk on a factory floor or in a crowded bar because of all the 
competing sounds, the noise. So, we shout, gesture, extravagantly 
mouth our words, and so on, to get our messages across. We deploy 
strategies of redundancy—additional communicative features 
alongside or overtop the basic signal—to ensure the more reliable 
reception of our message. But information-theoretic noise is not 
strictly auditory. It might also be an arresting visual distraction in 
the communicative environment, or a blast of cold air, or a 
headache, something that causes at least some of the parties to lose 
attention; or it might be part of the signal itself, such as the slurred 
speech of a drunk, or a strong accent, or drop-outs in a telephone 
call. Anything that interferes with signal transmission or reception 
is noise. Dementia brains are noisy; or, perhaps more precisely, are 
more vulnerable to noise. Anything that overcomes noise in these 
terms is redundancy—which brings us back to dementia, and to my 
neighbor’s hardly-working formula. 
Like most cognitive syndromes, dementia is not uniform. I am 
collapsing much variability for the sake of useful generalizations. In 
that spirit, we can define dementia as a clinical diagnosis of 
cognitive impairments, primarily of activities implicating memory, 
with significant linguistic correlates.4 The language-related 
 
4 Dementia can be caused by a variety of conditions, including 
degenerative diseases, stroke, depression, and head injury, but many 
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impairments almost inevitably become severe enough to hinder an 
individual’s ability to function in daily life, from minor levels of 
lexical-search problems that impede or preclude conversation or 
recalling instructions to more severe levels of incapacity, including 
even identity-defining memories, such as the names of one's 
children. 
3. Dementia and Rhetorical Figures 
I do not have a theoretically informed and validated theory of 
memory at play here. In my defence, psychologists don’t seem to 
have one either. They understand lots of the molecules involved in 
memory, and much of the neuroanatomy, and they have empirical 
results about recall capacities under various conditions, and they 
have pictures of blood flow in the brain under all kinds of 
stimulation. They also have hypotheses, partially integrated with 
these data. Maybe there are separate short-term and long-term 
subsystems. Maybe semantic and episodic information is ‘stored’ 
and ‘retrieved’ in different ways. Maybe working memory includes a 
phonological loop. But there are vast areas of neurocognition that 
psychology doesn’t know with true clarity, precision, or 
comprehensiveness. Psychology can’t say, for instance, how 
language is represented neurocognitively, or what it means to hear 
familiar or novel sound sequences, or how rhythms activate 
emotions. And it can’t say anything very definitive about memory at 
the level of interest relevant to these speculations. 
Instead of a theoretically informed and validated theory of 
memory, I have a productive pastiche of association and faculty 
psychologies, of perception experiments, largely from the Gestalt 
school, and of intuition. We all know, for instance, that repeating a 
phone number, or a name, or a narrative poem over and over to 
ourselves, vocally or subvocally, will help us remember it. We seem 
to be ‘practicing’ knowing it until we actually do know it, and the 
fact that neurons fire in patterns (that is, fire repetitively) in 
correspondence to stimuli suggests a mechanism whereby the 
number or name or poem becomes neurocognitively entrenched. 
Whatever. We all know that repetition is a factor in remembering 
information. We know that such notions as similarity and 
difference are perceptually important (shown in Gestalt 
 
conditions are age-related, and dementia mostly affects the elderly. The 
most common cause of dementia is Alzheimer Disease, a progressive, 
degenerative disease of the brain (Alzheimer Society of Canada, 2010; 
Tyas & Gutmanis, 2015). 
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experimentation) and endemic to our categorization (a theme in 
psychology at least as far back as Aristotle)—perception and 
categorization both being central to memory. There are other such 
factors at play in memory, and we will see some of them later (such 
as sequence), but we can proceed for now with these three 
(repetition, similarity and difference): “An apple a day keeps the 
doctor away” is cognitively resilient, we can say with confidence, 
because the syllable /ej/ repeats; because the prosodic structure of 
“apple a day” repeats in “the doctor away;” because day and away 
are similar (they share a syllable); because day and away are 
different (they both have different onsets to their syllabic nuclei 
and the latter also has an additional syllable); that is, because the 
colligation plays to the ways our mindbrains are structured.  
We have no idea how schemes arose, though it is difficult to 
believe they are products of conscious invention. While individual 
rhyming colligations, like “fun in the sun,” are personal creative 
inventions (or were at some point), rhyme itself not a personal 
creative invention. Just as metaphor is what you get when you add 
language to a mindbrain that works analogically, and antithesis is 
what you get when you add language to a mindbrain that works 
contrastively, so too is rhyme what you get when you add language 
to a mindbrain that works on repetition. Or, if rhyme can be said to 
be invented, so too was rhythm, affixation, grammatical roles, 
predication.  
There is something different about rhyme, however, that sets it 
apart from the flow of affixes, grammatical roles and predications 
from which it stands out, something that gives it the power to make 
expressions more cognitively resilient, something figurative.  
What makes rhyme different from 'just' language, the kind of 
language that grammarians and linguists generally care about—
phonotactics, subject-verb agreement, denotation, conventional 
syntax—the aspects of language that comprise the ground against 
which figures stand out? Nothing that is hard and fast. After all, lots 
of words in the routine flow of language rhyme—hum-drum, itsy-
bitsy, artsy-fartsy. But the default distribution of syllables in a 
language, within certain constraints, is ‘arbitrary.’ Rhyme is non-
arbitrary. Indeed, syllable distribution willfully avoids rhyme: 
“languages of the world frequently show evidence of conspiracies to 
avoid ‘accidental’ repetition of phoneme strings” (Menn & 
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MacWhinney, 1984, p. 519).5 The upshot is that it is uncommon for 
the same syllables to show up at the ends of words within hailing 
distance of each other. Rhyme seems, therefore, like something 
‘extra,’ something that is overlaid on ‘just’ language, on everyday 
language, bland language, hum-drum language; something 
redundant. That’s how figured language is always perceived—as 
standing out from ‘just’ language, violating its expectations in some 
way, deviating. That sense is not quite right, of course, because 
figures are woven into the fabric of everyday language. But it’s 
rightish, a kind of productive fiction, like the one physicists employ 
when they pretend weight and mass are different even though they 
never occur separately in matter. Groupe μ calls the fiction of 
figureless, arbitrary language, “degree-zero language” (1981, p. 
217), a hypothetical construct against which we define figural 
‘deviations.’  
My neighbor's frequent question to me (and related variants) 
stands out from the expectation of bland, arbitrary, degree-zero 
word distribution:  
1. Are you working hard, or hardly working? 
This expression is culturally entrenched as a blue-collar cliché, 
familiar among construction workers, road crews, factory workers, 
and so on. Individually, it is entrenched in my neighbor with 
Alzheimer's Disease. The neurocognitive features of colligations like 
1, and of poetry like “The Night I Cremated Sam McGee,” can help 
arm us against the perplexities and risks of cognitive decline. 
 
5 At the same time, however, Menn & MacWhinney note that there are 
strategies of repetition in those same languages that correlate with 
meaning; namely, those of “reduplication –which deliberately repeats 
material within morphs ...  in order to mark certain grammatical 
contrasts, achieve emphasis, and express relations iconically. Thus we see 
languages formally sanctioning the 'deliberate' repetition of all or part of a 
morph, even while going out of their way to prohibit 'accidental' 
repetition” (Menn & MacWhinney, 1984, p. 519). Aitchison (1994, p. 17) 
sees the prohibition and the sanction as paradoxical, but as rhetoricians, 
we realize that one does not get strategies of salience and form/function 
correspondences without a ‘literal’ ecology, a figure without a ground. We 
see this at play in the mechanisms languages provide to reduce lexical and 
phrasal repetitions as well—principally proforms and zeugmas. With no 
general restrictions against phonological repetitions, such specific 
repetitions as rhyme or alliteration would be invisible and meaningless.  
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The pattern underlying 1 is chiastic, a class of figures that repeats 
linguistic constituents in reverse order. Its most famous instance is 
perhaps by Alexander Dumas: 
2. [T]ous pour un, un pour tous. (1849, p. 129) 
All for one, one for all. (2010, p. 80) 
Our "working hard" example (1) is actually quite tricky in figurative 
terms. It is not an antimetabole like 2 (reverse lexical repetition), 
for instance, because only one word repeats, working. The 
hard/hardly alternation of 2 looks superficially like polyptoton (a 
theme-and-variation figure, similar-but-different, in which the 
lexical stem repeats with different affixes), but it’s only loosely 
polyptotonic. Polysemy is at play: hard in this colligation can be 
paraphrased with something like steadily or diligently; hardly can 
be paraphrased with something like barely or very little. That is, 
hard/hardly is not a lexical repetition (construed as the repetition 
of signans-signatum pairs), but only a formal repetition (just the 
signans).  
I emphasize this fact to make a point about the form of 1. The 
shifts of meaning and lexical relations are intricate, two linguistic 
factors that give people with dementia particular difficulties. My 
neighbor does not retain and deploy this phrase because of its 
lexical sophistication so much as because of its form, which we can 
perhaps see more clearly in an acoustic representation (Figure 1). 
Figure 1: An acoustic representation of a typical formulaic expression 
used by someone with mild Alzheimer’s disease 
Figure 1 only represents a loose correlation between the speech 
sounds (symbolized by letters) and the related acoustic signal, but it 
is close enough to make the point. In particular, notice the two 
highly similar clumps corresponding to working, and the similar 
syllabic nuclei with the two instances of hard. There are specific, 
identifiable reasons why this expression is a formula in blue collar 
registers: themes of work and effort are bound into a structure that 
resonates with certain neurocognitive biases, which makes it both 
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mnemonic and pleasing (or witty). The expression manifests two 
instances of repetition (working and hard[ly]), perhaps the deepest 
and most basic pattern bias. The expression also manifests a 
sequential contrast (reversal), another deep bias. (And topically, the 
theme of working with or without diligence in blue collar situations 
leads to frequent articulations, and therefore to familiarity.) 
Like all such formulae, that is, 1 has internal patterns that make it 
more memorable, that give it resilience in the face of memory 
decline.  
My neighbor is not alone. People with dementia speak very, very 
often in such formulae. It is one of the best-known characteristics of 
their speech. Kelly Ann Bridges and Diana Van Lancker-Sidtis 
(2013) define formulaic language in this context as "fixed 
expressions that are known to the native speaker,” including 
“idioms, proverbs, speech formulas/conventional expressions, 
expletives and pause-fillers" (p. 5)—many of which feature 
figuration. Attested examples of formulae in dementia speech 
include: 
3. Am I glad to see you girls. 
4. As a matter of fact, … 
5. Don’t call us – we’ll call you. 
6. Likewise, I’m sure. 
7. He snores to beat the band. 
8. They must be worth their weight in gold. 
9. Throws somebody a dirty curve. 
10. To err is human, to forgive divine. (Van Lancker-Sidtis & 
Rallon, 2004, pp. 222-232) 
The figurative patterns are pretty obvious here, but here's a quick 
tabulation of the more prominent figures: 
Alliteration: 3 (glad, girls), 7 (beat, band), 8 (worth, weight; 
they, their) 
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Assonance: 3 (am, glad), 4 (a, matter, fact), 6 (likewise, I'm), 
9 (dirty, curve) 
Consonance (excluding alliteration): 4 (of, fact) 5 (call, we'll), 
8 (they, worth, their) 
Epanaphora: 10 (to) 
Hyperbaton: 3 (Am I) 
Isocolon: 5, 10 
Mesodiplosis: 5 (call) 
Parison: 10 (Vinf < Adjective) 
There is yet more figural activity here, of course, including a few 
tropes, the antimetalepsis of 5 ('[you] call us' / 'we’ll call you'—like 
1, a chiastic figure, this one a inversion of signata without 
signantia), the metaphor of 9, the antithesis of 5, perhaps a meiosis 
(understatement) in 3’s girls, depending on who the referents are, 
but also the easily overlooked effects of lexical repetition. The 
mesodiplosis of 5 and the epanaphora of 10, in particular, give us 
alliteration and rhyme, since the repeated words necessarily begin 
with the same consonants and end with the same syllables. 
Schemes can sometimes entail other schemes in this way, which is 
almost always ignored in the discussion of figures but shows how 
the subcomponents of something like lexical repetition (namely, 
phonological repetitions) contribute to the cognitive resilience of 
the relevant utterances. 
In short, speaking in colligations of the sort that dementia 
researchers tag with labels like idioms, prefabrications, fixed 
expressions—even, occasionally, schemata—is a well-known feature 
of dementia speech, with occasional explanations about lowering 
the cognitive burden or compensating for a decline of memory, 
since one preassembled block of speech is assumed to be easier to 
retrieve than a bunch of independent component words, and since 
familiarity is closely related to entrenchment. But there is little to 
no attention paid in dementia research to why particular 
colligations cohere into such formulae. Cue the rhetoricians.  
In rhetoric the presence and texture of these formulae correlates 
with what we know by way of Burke's label of collaborative 
expectancy (1950, p. 58). A pattern, once known or felt, demands 
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its own completion. Charles Sanders Peirce coined two brilliant 
terms for this process, conceptually flanking percept, the sensual 
experience of a phenomenon: ponecept, the recent memory, the 
neurocognitive echo, of a percept, and antecept, the neurocognitive 
formation of an anticipated percept (CP 7.648; Peirce, 1966, p. 
382).6  
Ponecepts are what enable patterns of repetition. There can be no 
experience of mesodiplosis, for instance, unless its first element 
(call1 of 5) remains at some level of attention, is a ponecept, when 
the second element arrives as percept (call2). Isocolon would be 
impossible without a ponecept of prosody, parison without a 
ponecept of syntax. Antecepts are the agency of collaborative 
expectancy. There is no expectation of an imminent percept (band 
in 7) without the formation of antecepts (primed by the sequence 
“to beat the,” with its saliently ‘alliterative’ antecept, beat). 
Dementia formulae, that is, very frequently resonate 
neurocognitively, which is precisely what makes them more 
resilient against cognitive decline. Their prosodies are often roughly 
‘musical’ or 'poetic,' with parallelisms and balance, and music is 
perhaps the most resilient signal structure we know against 
memory loss (e.g. Baird & Thompson, 2018); the resilience and 
ameliorative effects of poetry are less well known, but my Sam 
McGee anecdote illustrates them nicely, and they are beginning to 
gain clinical and research attention (Swinnen, 2014). The resonant 
formal qualities of many colligations are the primary reason why 
some of them are more persistent in dementia speech. 
To no rhetorician's surprise, I am sure, dementia research has not 
turned to rhetorical figures for an account of why the formulae 
emerge symptomatically in the first place, why they have lodged in 
patient’s memories, or what features support their ready and 
recurrent retrieval, and their more fluent articulation. But rhetoric 
does have answers to suggest. 
4. Pattern Biases 
As Jeanne Fahnestock notes, “humans prefer patterns in 
perceptions” (2004, p. 124), and we prefer some patterns more 
than others. Figures achieve their effects "because of some 
 
6 We know that Burke read his Peirce, but it is not surprising he didn’t 
pick up these terms himself; they were unpublished during Burke’s period 
of feverish autodidacticism.   
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'universal' appeal" (Burke, 1950, p. 58) to the mental and 
physiological structures between our ears. In Peircean terms, there 
is a ready store of schematic antecepts (anteceptual schematics?) in 
the wait. What the precise catalogue of such pattern biases is 
remains to be worked out, as well as the ways in which they 
interact. Does Bias X carry more weight than Bias Y? What 
conspiracies of biases are more potent than others? What 
individual, cultural, linguistic, or pathological differences are there 
among the appeal of patterns? Considerable research needs to be 
done to even start addressing these questions. 
But we do have some dementia data currently on the table 
(Expressions 1, 3-10), and a few pattern biases are clearly relevant: 
repetition, demarcation, and sequential order. 
While it is notoriously difficult to link most cognitive processes or 
inclinations to the wetware that instantiates them—some cognitive 
scientists even talk of an “incommensurability between the 
languages of neuroscience and psychology” (Kagan & Baird, 2004, 
p. 100)—repetition is one phenomenon that is irrefutably common 
to both areas, to both ‘languages.’ We know, for instance, that 
neurons fire repetitively. We know that neural pathways build up by 
repetitions of the same firing patterns. We know that the most 
fundamental dynamic structures of cognition are brain rhythms; 
that is, highly repetitive neural firing patterns. We also know that 
when we want to remember something, we repeat it to ourselves 
over and over. Repetition is so obviously a matter equally of 
electrochemical neural activity and of cognitive salience that data is 
hardly required. 
Should we seek experimental verification, however, it is easy 
enough to come by. Bornstein (1989), for instance, conducted a 
meta-analysis of over two hundred experiments demonstrating the 
robustness of the mere-exposure effect, also known as the 
familiarity effect—repeated encounters with any stimuli whatsoever 
biases people toward those stimuli. In the case of formulaic speech, 
repetition not only contributes a kind of adhesion in the specific 
colligations (assonance, consonance, rhyme, isocolon, and ploke are 
all very frequent schemes in dementia formulae), repeatedly spoken 
and repeatedly encountered colligations wear the neural grooves 
more deeply, encouraging their presence in the flow of speech. As 
Joan Bybee has noted, "frequency of use affects the formation of 
grammar” (2006, p. 719). While rhetoricians (yours truly at least) 
might not be comfortable with the hegemony of the term grammar 
here, Bybee is certainly right that the more you hear and say 
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linguistic structures, the more predictably you will use them again; 
the more frequently you hear and say particular colligations, the 
more predictably they will reappear.  
Our cognitive and linguistic trafficking in sequential order is also 
deeply entrenched neurologically. A neural pathway, after all, is a 
temporal pattern, one firing activating subsequent firings in a given 
sequence, repeated again. We live in time and we speak in time. 
Linguistically, we give directions, write instructions, share recipes, 
tell stories, and perform a thousand other speech genres that are 
dependent on what comes before what, and formulaic colligations 
by definition are sequential patterns that become entrenched. 
Rhetorical theories of memory are often seen as spatial, and they 
are. Memory palaces are organized in space. ‘Parts’ of the argument 
are distributed in various locations throughout the palace, “in an 
architectural design of places” (Hutton, 1987, p. 371). But the places 
are not randomly distributed and the palace is activated in the 
course of giving a speech as an embodied sequence. “We have to 
think of the ancient orator as moving in imagination through his 
memory building whilst he is making his speech,” Frances Yates 
tells us,  
drawing from the memorized places the images he has placed 
them. This method also ensures that the points are 
memorized in the right order, since the order is fixed by the 
sequence of places in the building. (Yates, 2013, p. 3)7 
One can see the power of sequence in terms of general perception 
and categorization with the Gestalt notion of good continuation 
(Koffka, 1999, pp. 153-154 et passim) and in terms of rhetorical 
figures with Burke's collaborative expectancy. Recall that what 
Burke tells us is that when we get the gist of a pattern, we 
 
    7 While I take a largely amodal neurocognitive stylistic approach in this 
paper, another of the canons may also prove valuable for the intersection 
of rhetoric and dementia, delivery. This passage from Yates reminds us 
that mental activity is embodied, in that one does not just pluck a memory 
from the palace in some abstract way but by imagining one’s body 
performing actions. Gibbs (2005, pp. 148-151) outlines how performing 
actions and activating neural circuitry associated with bodily actions is 
implicated in linguistic memory. My father’s experience in learning “The 
Cremation of Sam McGee,” for instance, was not a matter of wrinkling his 
brow and staring at a page, but of reading aloud to the class, rehearsing 
passages to siblings and to the great outdoors as he strolled back to the 
farm, performing it to his parents; that is, of regularly enacting the poem 
through bodily activities.  
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"collaborate [with it] by spontaneously willing its completion and 
perfection as an utterance" (1950, p. 59); that is, our antecepts 
surface and push the completion of the pattern that has been 
established by the ponecepts. We take up the sequence and 
continue it. 
Repetition and sequential order are utterly intertwined. What is a 
lexical repetition (ploke) but a repeated sequence of phones (or 
letters), a syntactic repetition (parison) but a repeated sequence of 
phrases, a prosodic repetition (isocolon) but a repeated sequence of 
variously stressed and unstressed syllables? What is a culturally 
and cognitively robust lexical colligation (maxim, gnome, sententia, 
proverb, cliché, prefabrication, …) but a sequence of words that has 
been repeated often enough to become cognitively and culturally 
entrenched? 
And there is another pattern bias integral to the 
repetition/sequence complex, of equal significance for the 
neurocognitive pull of rhetorical figures: position, which can be 
‘mutual’ or ‘local.’ We can only have a sequence of elements if the 
elements are mutually ordered: some elements come before other 
elements; conversely, with a shift in perspective, some elements 
come after other elements; and, therefore, some elements come 
before and after differing elements (that is, between them). That's 
mutual position, and it is important in a sequence when there is 
something shifting characteristically, most notably in tropes like 
incrementum, when the value of some semantic attribute increases, 
as in the monetary increase of 11.  
11. My son, even if you were to give me all the silver and gold, 
precious stones and pearls that are in the world, I would 
not dwell anywhere except in a place of Torah. (Pirkei 
Avot)  
Abeles, Jack, and Singer, in this issue, show the multimodality of 
scalar sequences in their discussion of pain judgements.  
Mutual position is also definitive for the chiastic figures, like my 
neighbor’s refrain (1), in which the same elements precede and 
follow each other. The standard formalism for chiastic figures 
captures this mutuality of relative position nicely: ABBA.  
In ‘local’ terms, position is relative to landmarks, adapting a label 
from Ron Langacker’s Cognitive Grammar (e.g. 1987, p. 217ff). 
Three local positions are important for schemes, initial and final—
 
Harris 18  Poroi 15,1 (January 2020) 
 
that is, at the "edges" or "boundaries" of figural constituents—and 
medial, between such edges.8 As perceiving organisms, we need 
sensitivity to "edges" or "boundaries" to navigate the world, because 
they signal a shift in perceived objects. Maria Chait frames it in 
these terms: "edge detection is one of the fundamental processes 
[upon] which object detection – a more complex process – is built" 
(2006, p. 217). It is easy, or at least intuitive, to understand this 
process in visual terms. Significant changes in brightness (often 
abetted by changes in hue) correspond to regions of visual 
perception where a pencil 'ends' and the paper upon which it lies 
'begins,' where the paper ends and the desk begins, the desk ends 
and nondesk emptiness begins. These impressions are supported by 
extensive neurophysiological and cognitive research, which has 
assigned these tasks to specific neural mechanisms (see Elder & 
Sachs, 2004 for a summary of relevant research). Similar 
mechanisms are at work discriminating acoustic 'objects,' auditory 
sensations that correspond to discriminatory differences, a process 
called "auditory edge detection" or (since sound is ineffably 
temporal) "temporal edge detection." Chait defines this process as 
"the neural basis of [a] listener’s ability to make sense of an ever 
changing, complex acoustic world" (2006, p. 3). 
Auditory or temporal 'objects' might seem abstract at first pass, 
but we understand and categorize temporal phenomena through 
reification, such as ‘the roar of a lion,’ ‘the snap of a branch,’ ‘the 
burp of an infant.’ These are all events that have a duration, but by 
assigning them nouns we treat the roar every bit as corporeally as 
the lion, the snap as the branch, the burp as the infant. If one thinks 
in musical or speech terms, acoustical objecthood may seem more 
natural: notes, in the first place; phonemes, syllables, words, 
phrases and clauses in the second. The mechanisms for edge/object 
detection in language are complex and multifactorial, and very 
language specific—for instance, one of the ways we know that the 
sequence bingbong should be segmented as bing | bong is because 
no syllables or words in English can begin with ng (phonetically, 
the sound is represented as [ŋ]), so bi | ngbong is ruled out. Other 
languages, like Vietnamese or Cambodian, in which [ŋ] can begin 
words, might segment the sequence differently. But the important 
 
8 While Richard Gregg does not consider rhetorical figures at all in his 
neglected (1984) classic, Symbolic inducement and knowing, his 
neurorhetorical approach has been important to my research generally 
and his attention to edge discrimination (pp. 33-40, et passim) is 
especially important for the line of research here. The actual neuroscience 
in Gregg's book is somewhat dated, but the results appear to have held up. 
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point is simply that language users do, naturally and easily, most of 
the time, perceive objects like phonemes, syllables, and words, 
which means they perceive the relevant boundaries, the edges 
where one such object ends and another begins, even though the 
actual acoustic signal is usually one big schmoosh. As Figure 1 
shows, the syllables do not have sharp separations. They blur into 
one another. 
It is this tuning-to-edges that makes beginnings and endings 
particularly salient locations of figural action, especially in 
combination with repetition, giving us such figures as alliteration 
(phoneme repetition at the beginning of words), rhyme (syllable 
repetition at ends of words), epanaphora (lexical repetition at 
beginning of phrases or clauses) and epiphora (lexical repetition at 
ends of phrases or clauses). Abeles et al., in this issue, discuss 
positional lexical repetitions in the context of wind-turbine 
protests, showing how common they are in ordinary language 
(2019).9 
5. Rhetorical Schemes or Linguistic Symptoms? 
Prefabricated utterances in neurocognitively biased packages are 
obviously rhetorical, in the sense of fitting into the patterns 
rhetoricians have investigated for millennia, but their rhetorical 
activity is not so obvious. They are not quite dead figures in the way 
that table leg is a dead metaphor and seat of a chair is a dead 
metonym, words whose figural roots are so deep as to be completely 
lost. One cannot say or hear rolly-polly or red sky at night, sailors 
delight without their figural presence standing out from the prosaic 
ground. Around my family home, one could not even stumble into a 
rhyme, a wholly accidental collocation of word-final syllable 
repetition, without someone saying "you're a poet and don't know 
it."10 Because they are primarily material, rather than conceptual, it 
is hard to kill and bury a scheme. Dead or dormant tropes are like 
underwear or socks, obscured by other material; schemic prefabs 
 
9 Abeles et al. use the term epistrophe for clause-final lexical repetition. 
I prefer epiphora because of its formal (and etymological) contrast to 
epanaphora, clause-initial lexical repetition.  
10 Apparently there is more to this formula than I originally knew, in a 
dementia poetry intervention, one of the participants came up with an 
extended version, replete with paronomasia: "He’s a poet and doesn’t 
know it, but his feet surely show it, cause they’re Longfellows" (Swinnen, 
2016, p. 1388). 
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are more like outer wear or hats, unmistakably on the visible 
surface. 
What about in the pathological context? How rhetorical are 
schemic prefabs with respect to dementia? There are two directions 
this answer can take, in terms of production and in terms of 
interaction or treatment. On the one hand, they are diagnostic. An 
increasing use of prefabrications against previous speech patterns 
and/or a linguistic baseline can signal cognitive impairment. 
Prefabs are one of several linguistic indicants of cognitive 
impairment in dementia.11 Other linguistic indicants include, for 
instance, a marked decrease in unique words in a given dementia 
language episode: once words enter an episode, they are recycled 
with high frequency, which means an overall lower vocabulary 
range. There is also a strong trend toward 'light words,' so-called 
because of their low ‘semantic weight’ (words such as thing, place, 
and stuff). But it is worth noting in this context that they are also 
the most frequent terms in their domains (that is, repeated more 
often in general discourse). They are encountered more often, and 
so they stay closer to the front of the neural-pathway rolodex 
(Bybee, 2006). 
In figural terms, boundary repetitions of sounds as well as words 
is increasingly common as dementia advances. Take these two 
examples which satisfy the standard definition of epanaphora 
("[r]epetition of the same word at the beginning of successive 
clauses or verses" [Lanham, 1991, p. 11]): 
12. I say to my wife  
I say in here  
and I can’t think of words (Meteyard & Patterson, 2009, p. 
129) 
13. Lost my teddy 
Lost my book 
Lost my keys 
Lost my bird 
Lost my love 
Lost my way 
 
11 The term common in the dementia literature is actually linguistic 
biomarkers. My preference for linguistic indicants is an attempt to 
reserve biomarker for more obviously physiological markers of pathology, 
such as the presence of amyloid plaques or neurofibrillary tangles in 
Alzheimer’s Disease. 
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Lost my mind 
Lost my soul (Swaffer, 2012) 12 
Example 12 is classed as an error (specifically, a disjointed planning 
error), of the sort we are all capable of committing now and again. 
But the scale goes way up in dementia. Example 13 is classed as a 
poem, a particularly moving one given its authorship by Kate 
Swaffer, who has dementia. 
Taking them in turn, is 12 a rhetorical figure? Can an error be a 
figure? By the poet-but-don't-know-it metric, spontaneous 
productions are figures. By the heuristic of my research group, "A 
figure is a figure is a figure" (e.g. Harris & Di Marco, 2017, 2018). 
That is, if a piece of language fits the structural definition of a figure 
(as 12 does, of Lanham's definition for epanaphora), irrespective of 
external considerations (in particular, intentionality), it is an 
instance of that figure. Example 12 also satisfies a basic 
requirement of all rhetorical figures, "the detected alteration of 
degree zero" (Groupe μ, 1981, p. 37), standing out as a salient 
linguistic configuration against the ground of mundane, entrenched 
speech conventions theoretically reduced to a hypothetical degree 
of absolute blandness13). 
What this means, of course, is that rhetorical schemes can be 
indices, symptoms, of psychological states—perhaps of fatigue or 
distraction when 'normal' people make such errors, and cognitive 
decline when pathologies are involved. But the more crucial fact 
here, whatever we choose to do with definitions, is that 12 indicates 
 
12 This poem has a curious citation history. I encountered it in Petrescu, 
MacFarlane, & Ranzijn (2014, p. 211), with very ambiguous sourcing. I 
later discovered the fuller sourcing in a fascinating editorial by its author, 
Kate Swaffer (2016), who gave the source as Swaffer (2012), though 
without pagination (and I have not been able to consult it directly). 
13 The Groupe μ rubric does not generally present a challenge to 
schemes, as we have seen, since entrenched (rolly-polly) and accidental 
(poet / don't-know-it) schemes still register as deviations at some 
perceptible level. But there is some challenge in entrenched—though 
perhaps not accidental—tropes, along the leg-of-a-table and spend-a-
weekend line. With 'dormant' tropes, the cognitive motivation behind 
their coinage has wholly atrophied, so that they appear entirely arbitrary, 
just another symbol. For my money, however, we can just extend the 
degree-zero notion historically back to their coinage. While this approach 
probably makes all words tropes, except for very rare instances like 
Murray Gell-Mann's invention of quark (and even that seems to have 
some metonymic explanation in his unconscious). I'm OK with that. 
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that repetition triggers a neurocognitive bias which is functionally 
correlated with cognitive resilience, and that linguistic 'boundaries' 
are locations of significant figural activity. Example 12, in short, 
tells us not only something about the speaker but also about the 
speech, about rhetorical figuration. 
And 13? Is Kate Swaffer's poem full of epanaphora? This certainly 
seems an easier question to answer. It satisfies the two conditions 
we just rehearsed for 12: it fits the definition and stands out from a 
ground of prosaic speech. It also has a higher degree of artfulness 
and design, so it presents none of the intentionality complications 
of 12. One can certainly wonder, though, to what extent those 
epanaphora are also diagnostic. The theme clearly signals Swaffer's 
concern with a loss of Self, the most terrifying fear of those who 
suffer from dementia, until the loss becomes so great that even the 
nature of that fear dissolves. The overall form signals the trajectory 
of the disease, from rendering the daily management of material 
relations difficult, losing objects, to the dissolution of Self, as the 
reifications set in over the last four lines (the last three lines, as 
well, can be taken as an incrementum). 
But the epanaphora may also signal the type of repetitive 
behaviour that characterizes much dementia, returning again and 
again to rummage idly in the cutlery drawer, for instance, and 
perhaps the cognitive gravity that beginning-landmarks have. I am 
not suggesting that Kate Swaffer has not crafted the poem for 
artistic (and pathotic) effects. Rather, I am asking to what degree 
her attraction to beginnings and repetitions might be dementia-
related.  
On the interaction or treatment front, figures are already a very 
common feature of clinicians and care-giver's speech, where the 
intention is clear. Lexical repetitions, in particular, are a very 
common feature of dementia care-giver speech—as, in fact, they are 
in infant care-giver speech. In both cases, they aid the memory and 
understanding of the hearer.  
6. Conclusion 
A more honest title for this paper might be, "A few hopeful 
speculations about dementia, rhetorical schemes, and cognitive 
resilience"—and all blessings on Poroi for providing a forum for this 
kind of incipient theorizing.  
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One has to start somewhere, and I am confident in the evidence 
that the neurocognitive biases which shape rhetorical schemes can 
also contribute to our understanding of, perhaps even our diagnosis 
of, and certainly our treatment of, dementias. The cognitive 
resilience of rhetorical figures, their redundancy against the noise 
of distraction, attentional ebbs, and the decline of memory, are all 
relevant to how we converse with, and listen to, cognitively 
impaired people.  
I have not really served up anything that would count as a 
research program, but I have done a couple of important, 
preliminary things, following through on the even more preliminary 
suggestions of my 2013 Poroi article. I have claimed, with evidence 
and argumentation, that rhetorical schemes are a function of 
linguistic domains and neurocognitive biases. I have claimed, with 
evidence and argumentation, that these biases contribute to the 
cognitive resilience and cultural robustness of figural instances, like 
proverbs and clichés. And I have observed that such instances show 
their cognitive resilience in the way their frequency increases in the 
speech of people with dementia. 
And I have claimed, with evidence and argumentation (last 
epanaphora of the paper; I promise), that rhetorical schemes might 
serve diagnostic purposes for cognitive conditions and syndromes. 
My hope is that I have also interested you in exploring the ways in 
which rhetoric might contribute to dementia studies, and ultimately 
to helping the lives it afflicts.  
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